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Post-Teva: When Will the Federal
Circuit Embrace the Deferential




In January 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.' (" Teva") overturned twenty years of precedent when it
held that patent claim construction was no longer exclusively a question of
law reviewed de novo.2 The standard of review defines how much deference
an appellate court must accord a trial court's decision on appeal. How much
deference appellate courts afford trial judge decisions is best described us-
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2 Id. at 835-40.
See Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 233, 235 (2009).
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ing a law/fact paradigm.' On appeal, appellate courts give no deference to
questions of law,' while trial court findings involving issues of fact are given
some deference.! Prior to Teva, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit ("Federal Circuit") identified patent claim construction as exclusively
a question of law, giving it no deference on appeal. In Teva, the Court split
the baby and held that when claim construction is based solely on intrinsic
evidence, it is a question of law reviewed de novo (or without deference).'
But, when the trial court makes findings of fact based on extrinsic evidence,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)' ("Rule 52(a)") requires a deferential
standard of review.o In other words, an appellate court must not overturn a
trial judge's factual findings based on extrinsic evidence, unless they are clearly
erroneous." Even though the Supreme Court has changed the standard of
review for claim construction, few cases have come out differently under the
new standard. The Federal Circuit continues to decide cases as if Teva never
happened. Post- Teva, the Federal Circuit must give deference to trial court
' See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) ("[T]he fact/law distinction at times
has turned on a determination that ... one judicial actor is better positioned than another
to decide the issue in question."). See generally Kelly Kunsch, Standard ofReview (State and
Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 11 (1994).
See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). The Rule reads, in pertinent part: "(6) Setting Aside the
Findings. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's
opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility." Id.
' Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (" [A]s a purely
legal question, we review claim construction de novo on appeal including any allegedly fact-
based questions relating to claim construction."); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc. (Markman 1), 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), ajfd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996) ("[W]e conclude that the interpretation and construction of patent claims ... is a
matter of law exclusively for the court.").
8 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 ("[W]hen the district court
reviews only evidence intrinsic to the patent[,] . . . the judge's determination will amount
solely to a determination of law [reviewed de novo].").
' FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) reads, in pertinent part:
(1) In General. In an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately. The
findings and conclusions may be stated on the record after the close of the evidence or
may appear in an opinion or a memorandum of decision filed by the court. Judgment
must be entered under Rule 58.
Id. (emphasis added).
Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841.
Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6)).
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findings of fact as required under Rule 52(a).12 Thus, in cases where the dis-
trict court reviews extrinsic evidence but does not make findings of fact based
on that extrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit must remand to the district
court to make those findings.13 It is inappropriate for the Federal Circuit to
substitute its claim construction for the district court's and not remand for
findings of fact.
Before Teva, treating patent claim construction as a question of law had
the effect of eliminating Rule 52(a)'s relevance. Because evidence related to
claim construction was a question of law, trial courts were not required to
make findings of fact when evaluating the evidence." Resultantly, cases that
were pending before Teva generally do not have robust records containing trial
court findings of fact." Thus, it is often unclear what the trial court relied on
in making its claim construction determination. Because claim construction
received no deference on appeal, trial courts, accordingly, did not always
document their findings."
This Article highlights that the standard of review, as well as whether a ques-
tion is one of law or fact, is ultimately determined by policy considerations.1
In other words, the inquiry does not end when a question is labeled as one
of law or fact." Instead, what should command our attention is the reason
why courts label an issue as legal or factual." Labeling claim construction as
solely a question of law has elevated the Federal Circuit, a reviewing court,
and displaced the traditional factfinders, the trial courts. Part I addresses the
policy considerations underlying the Federal Circuit's standard of review in
claim construction and its interest in asserting control over claim construc-
tion determinations. Part II discusses and analyzes the Supreme Court's
policy considerations and how they differ from the Federal Circuit's. Part
III highlights the Federal Circuit's post- Teva recalcitrance in embracing the
new standard of review, exposing the court's failure to follow Rule 52(a) as
required by the Supreme Court.
12 Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1).
See Mark A. Lemley, Why do Juries Decide ifPatents are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REv. 1673,
1725 (2013).
See id. (" [S]ince Markman, very few infringement issues present genuine factual dis-
putes.. . .").
" See Markman I, 52 F.3d 967, 979-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), ajfd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
7 See Michael R. Bosse, Standards ofReview: The Meaning ofWords, 49 ME. L. REv. 367,
373 (1997).
" See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110-11 (1995) ("[T]he proper characteriza-
tion of a question as one of fact or law is sometimes slippery."); Bosse, supra note 17, at 373.
" Bosse, supra note 17, at 373.
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I. What are the Policy Considerations the Federal Circuit
Reviewed When it Determined Claim Construction is a
Question of Law?
In 1995, the Federal Circuit in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.20
("Markman 1') held that courts have the power and the obligation to construe
patent claims as a matter of law, settling all prior case law inconsistencies.21
Previously, the Federal Circuit's conflicting precedent fluctuated between
treating claim construction as a legal question and treating the issues as a
mixed question based on underlying facts.22 At one time, the Federal Circuit
recognized that, although claim construction was ultimately a question of
law,23 it might "require the fact-finder to resolve certain factual issues such as
what occurred during the prosecution history."24 In McGill Inc. v. John Zink
Co. ,25 the Federal Circuit noted that, when a claim term is disputed and "ex-
trinsic evidence is needed to explain the meaning, construction of the claims
could be left to a jury." 26
There were other cases that left the jury free to resolve a conflict when
the intrinsic evidence was ambiguous. For example, in Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v.
Proma Produkt- Und Marketing Geselschaft,2 the specification supported the
interpretation the patentee put forth, but the prosecution history supported
the alleged infringer's differing interpretation.28 Because the intrinsic evidence
was ambiguous, the parties utilized expert witness testimony to support their
respective arguments.29 The trial court allowed thej ury to weigh this testimony.30
On appeal, the question of infringement rested on the claim interpreta-
tion. The Federal Circuit reviewed "whether a reasonable jury could have
20 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), ajfd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
21Id. at 979.
22 CompareTol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft, 945 F.2d 1546,
1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1017,
1021 (Fed. Cir. 1987), withTillotson, Ltd. v. Walbro Corp., 831 F.2d 1033, 1037 (Fed. Cir.
1987), Howes v. Med. Components, Inc., 814 F.2d 638, 643 (Fed. Cir. 1987), andMoeller
v. lonetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
23 McGill Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 671 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (" [A] determination
of the scope of the claims, is a question of law.").
24 Arachnid Inc. v. Medalist Mktg. Corp., 972 F.2d 1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
2' 736 F.2d 666 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
26 Id. at 672 (citing Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753 (Fed. Cir. 1984));
see also Lemley, supra note 14, at 1719-22.
27 945 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
28 Id. at 1550-51.
29 Id. at 1551.
o See id. at 1552.
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interpreted the claim in a way that supports its [noninfringement] finding."31
After reviewing the specification, the prosecution history, and analyzing the
conflicting experts on both sides, the Federal Circuit used a very deferential
review standard. The court affirmed the judgment finding that a reasonable
jury could have reached the verdict of noninfringement.
32 Interestingly, the
Federal Circuit, at this time, welcomed the jury as a factfinder to assist in
claim construction.33 But, by 1995, this affinity began to splinter the court.
A. Getting to Markman I
In Markman I, the court discussed policy reasons for abandoning its prec-
edent and holding that claim interpretation is a legal matter for the court.34
First, the Federal Circuit noted the Supreme Court had "repeatedly held
that the construction of a patent claim is a matter of law exclusively for the
court."35 Second, the Federal Circuit rejected the notion that a jury should
construe patent claims. In particular, the court stated that "[i]t has long
been and continues to be a fundamental principle of American law that the
construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the court."36 The court
also noted that a patent is a fully integrated written instrument and, thus, is
uniquely situated to have its meaning determined by a court as a matter of
law, just like other written instruments.3 In particular, the court emphasized
that it is important that a "judge, trained in the law"38 provides the public
notice function of accurately describing the scope of a patentee's rights,
giving them "legal effect.39 Here, the court makes a policy decision that a
judge is better at providing a true and consistent claim construction than a
33Id
MarkmanI, 52 F.3d 967,978-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), afd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
SId at 977 (citing Singer Mfg. Co. v. Cramer, 192 U.S. 265,275 (1904); Mkt. St. Cable
Ry. Co. v. Rowley, 155 U.S. 621, 625 (1895); Coupev. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1895);
Heald v. Rice, 104 U.S. 737, 749 (1881); Bischoffv. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812, 816
(1869); Winans v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. (21 How.) 88, 100 (1858); Winans v.
Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1853); Silsby v. Foote, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 218,
225 (1852); Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 437, 484 (1848)).
SId at 978 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 180, 186 (1805)).
37Id
Id at 979.
Id at 978-79 (quoting Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815,
819 n.8. (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("They may understand what is the scope of the patent owner's
rights by obtaining the patent and prosecution history-the undisputed public record.")
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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jury, which benefits both the public and the patentee.
0 Thus, the court holds
claim construction is a matter of law and is reviewed de novo, or without
deference, on appeal. It is important to note, however, that making claim
interpretation exclusively a legal question is a backdoor way of limiting the
42
role of the jury in patent cases.
To further the argument that claim construction is a legal question, the
court minimized the importance of extrinsic evidence in claim construction.
The more claim construction can be resolved without looking externally for
evidence to interpret a claim's meaning, the more it resembles a question of
law. Consequently, the court maintained that extrinsic evidence merely aids
a court's understanding of scientific principles in order to help the court find
the true meaning of claims. In other words, extrinsic evidence is needed
because the court may be unfamiliar with terminology used in a patent, but
it is not needed for resolving claim terminology.4' According to the Federal
Circuit, claim construction is "still based upon the patent and prosecution
history[,]" and not on findings of fact.
One wrinkle in declaring claim construction a question of law in Markman
I is discussed in footnote 8 of the case. In cases where a patent claim is a
means-plus-function claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112 , it is necessary to analyze
equivalents to determine the literal scope of the patent claim.0 "A finding of
4 See id. at 979.
42 See id. at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("By holding that these disputed technologic
questions are matters of law, . . . previously triable to a jury as of right, will now be decided
by the trial judge[.]").
411d. at 1005-06.
4 Id. at 981 (majority opinion) (holding claim construction, even when extrinsic evidence
enlightens construction, is still based on prosecution history and is a matter of law subject to
de novo review); see also Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 850 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (analogizing claim construction to statutory construction where in-
terpreting meaning involves only conclusions of law, and not subsidiary evidentiary findings).
4 Markman I, 52 F.3d at 980.
4 Id. at 986.
4 Id. at 9 8 1.
4 Id. at 977 n.8. The footnote reads:
Palumbo also presented the issue of construction of means-plus-function claim limita-
tions under 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6. As that issue is not before us today, we express
no opinion on the issue of whether a determination of equivalents under § 112, para.
6 is a question of law or fact.
35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012).
" Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308,1320 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (" [A]n equivalent
under § 112, 1 6 informs the claim meaning for a literal infringement analysis.").
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equivalence is a determination of fact."" This statement flies in the face of
interpreting means-plus-function claims as a question of law. To avoid this
contradiction, the Federal Circuit, in a footnote, expressed no opinion on
whether determining equivalents is a question of law or fact and excluded
that issue from the Markman Iopinion.52 This furthered the policy choice not
to give juries input into claim construction. Plus, this meant the court did
not have to acknowledge that fact questions could potentially enter into the
claim construction analysis. It also demonstrates the Federal Circuit's interest
in controlling the claim construction determination.
Both concurring and dissenting opinions discussed competing policy con-
cerns.53 The minority opinions likened patent claim construction to contract
interpretation, as analyzing triable issues of fact." The majority disputed this
analogy because patents are integrated documents" and, unlike in a contract,
extrinsic evidence cannot vary patent claim terms." When there are ambigui-
ties, the question of a fact in contract cases rests on the parties's subjective
intent, whereas subjective intent is irrelevant in prosecuting applications before
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO")." Instead, the inquiry is
an "objective test of what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention would have understood the term to mean."
On the other hand, the majority found statutory interpretation, not con-
tract interpretation, a closer analogy to claim construction, where " [t] here can
be only one correct interpretation of a statute that applies to all persons."
Furthermore, "[s]tatutes like patents, are enforceable against the public, un-
like private agreements between contracting parties[,]" and create liability
for third parties.h Tus, according to the majority, interpreting statutes is a
more "accurate model than the contractual one for purposes of determining
whether constitutional protections are transgressed by assigning claim con-
struction exclusively to judges."
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).
Markman , 52 E3d at 977 n.8.
Id. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring); id. at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting). Primarily, the
minority judges were confounded by the diminished role for the jury in claim interpretation
and discussed this lesser role as a violation of the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 1000.
Id. at 1000-01.
Id. at 984-85 (majority opinion).
Id. at 9 8 5.
Id. (" [I] t is not unusual for there to be a significant difference between what an inventor
thinks his patented invention is and what the ultimate scope of the claims is after allowance [.1").
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B. Getting to Markman II
On appeal to the Supreme Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.6 2
("Markman I'), the question was whether claim interpretation was a matter
of law exclusively for the court or whether there was a Seventh Amendment
right to jury trial on any disputed expert testimony on the matter.63 In the
face of insufficient historical data to determine whether there was a Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial on claim construction in 1791, the Supreme
Court, as a matter of policy, stated judges are better than juries in analyzing
written documents." The Court held that claim interpretation was a matter
exclusively within the province ofthe court, not the jury." However, the Court
refrained from declaring whether the question was one of fact or law." The
Supreme Court uncoupled whether claim interpretation was a factual or legal
question from its standard of review on appeal." The policy considerations
the Supreme Court contemplated are discussed in Part II of this Article.
C. Markman II and the Federal Circuit's Reading of It
The Federal Circuit took Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.'" en banc to
address whether Markman His consistent with the Federal Circuit's view that
claim construction is a question oflaw." In Cybor, the Federal Circuit emphati-
cally concluded that the Supreme Court in Markman Ileft "Markman Ias the
controlling authority regarding [the Federal Circuit's] standard of review." 0 It
held that claim construction is a purely legal question to be reviewed de novo
on appeal and overruled any precedent o the contrary.7' Despite the Supreme
Court's decision not to address whether claim interpretation was a question
of fact or law, the Federal Circuit rejected the idea that the Supreme Court
left the question open.72 Instead, the court stated there were no subsidiary
fact questions involved in interpreting claims that would receive a deferential
62 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
1 Id. at 372.
SId. at 388; see Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1463-64 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc) (Mayer, C.J., concurring) (explaining that the Supreme Court "as a matter
of policy [decided] that judges, not juries, are better able to perform [claim construction]
given the complexity of evidence and documentation").
6 Markman II, 517 U.S. at 390.
6 See id.
6 See id. at 388.
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standard of review on appeal.7 The Federal Circuit highlighted the Supreme
Court's statements that, even though credibility determinations of witnesses
could play a role in claim construction, "the chance of such an occurrence
is doubtful and that any credibility determinations will be subsumed within
the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document . . . .""
The concurring opinions stated that the majority had converted the Supreme
Court's Markman II opinion and reinstated Markman I. Just because claim
construction had become a question for the court did not necessarily mean
that it was a question of law subject to de novo review, without deference to
trial court fact-findings-jettisoning the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
Judge Rader, in his dissent, stressed the Federal Circuit's new pursuit of using
Markman IIto avoid giving deference to the trial judge and the trial process.6
Note, this perspective differs from the court's original concern, which was to
remove the jury from the process -an issue Markman Hlaid to rest. Thus,
it appears that through giving no deference to trial judge findings of fact, the
Federal Circuit seeks to exert control over the entire claim construction process.
D. Post-Cybor Distinguishing Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic
Evidence
In Phillips v. AWH Corp.," the Federal Circuit, en banc, took its first steps
to emphasize the relative importance of intrinsic evidence (the patent claims,
specification, and prosecution history) over extrinsic evidence (dictionaries,
treatises, expert testimony) in construing claims.o Historically, a trial court's
evaluation of intrinsic evidence to construe claims is a question of law hav-
ing de novo review on appeal." By diminishing the importance of extrinsic
Id. at 1455.
Id. at 1455-56 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Markman I, 517 U.S.
370, 389 (1996)).
7 Id. at 1464 (Mayer, C.J., concurring) (" [T]he Court would not ... have repealed part of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence without [mentioning] that district courts
no longer [may] admit expert evidence[.]"); id. at 1481 (Rader, J., dissenting) ("It follows
that the trial court's factual findings with respect to evidence relevant to claim interpretation
should be treated, on appeal, like any other finding of the trial court.").
7 Id. at 1473 (Rader, J., dissenting) (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated and remandedon other grounds,
520 U.S. 1111 (1997)).
7 See id. at 1456 (majority opinion).
7 Markman I, 517 U.S. at 384.
7 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
" Id. at 1317.
8 SeeTeva Phams. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836 (2015).
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evidence, the Federal Circuit furthered its position that claim interpretation
is a question of law, thus solidifying its control over claim construction.
Phillips v. AWH Corp. overrules Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,82
which weighted objective resources like dictionary, encyclopedic, and treatise
meanings (extrinsic evidence) as more reliable in interpreting claims than
the specification or prosecution history.83 The purpose for the Texas Digital
methodology was to guard against reading limitations from the specification
into the claims, which is prohibited. The en banc court in Phillips held that
restricting the role of the specification in claim construction was improper,
thus overruling Texas Digital."' Further, Phillips adhered to Vitronics Corp. V.
Conceptronic, Inc."' and its hierarchy for weighing evidence to interpret claims,
starting with anointing intrinsic evidence as the most significant source for
interpreting disputed claim language."
In Vitronics, the most significant evidence for defining claim scope is to
review the words in the claim." Second, it is important to look to the speci-
fication, because an inventor is free to be his or her own lexicographer and
define terms as inconsistent with ordinary meanings.A9 Third, the court should
give weight to the prosecution history, which contains a record of what was
said between the applicant and the patent examiner in the USPTO.o Vit-
ronics had emphasized that, if ambiguities in claim language can be resolved
by looking at the intrinsic evidence alone, it is improper to rely on extrinsic
evidence.1 Extrinsic evidence may be considered to assist in teasing out the
meaning or scope of technical terms, but not to contradict the indisputable
public record.92 Vitronics also had created a hierarchy for weighing extrinsic
evidence. Objective evidence like dictionaries and treatises, which are available
to the public and unaltered by litigation, are preferred over expert opinion
testimony, which is less reliable because it is litigation driven.93 In Phillips,
the court clarified that nothing in Vitronics is meant to create a rigid algo-
308 E3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See Phillips, 415 E3d at 1319.
Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1204-05; seePhilips, 415 F.3dat 1319-20 (quoting SciMed
Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
Philips, 415 F.3d at 1320.
90 F.3d 1576 (1996).
Philips, 415 F.3d at 1312, 1314-15; see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
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rithm for claim construction." Instead, the point is to explain which types of
evidence are more valuable than others." It is a hierarchy of importance that
is described, and not a recipe with a specific sequence to analyze evidence."
Judge Mayer, in his dissent, saw the court's insistence that claim interpreta-
tion is a question of law as a way to elevate its importance and disregard its
reviewing role as an appellate court." Rather than introducing predictability
to patent law, the Federal Circuit has instead created "the substitution of a
black box, as it so pejoratively has been said of the jury, with the black hole
of this court."" In particular, the dissent described the court's insistence on
using the de novo standard of review to control the outcome of the case."
The failure to admit that there is a factual component o claim interpretation
continues to drive unworkable standards litigants cannot apply.1 ooJudge Mayer
also referred to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)o as requiring appellate
courts to not set aside trial court findings of fact unless they are clearly er-
roneous, thus giving substantial deference to those findings.102 He also noted
that underlying factual inquiries evaluated for obviousness determinations are
generally necessary to claim construction, and yet the factual underpinnings
for obviousness are given deferential review.103
In Lighting Ballast ControlLLC v. Philips Electronics North America Corp.,1o4
the Federal Circuit sat en banc, primed to take another look at Cybor and its
de novo standard of review stance.10' The court agreed to reconsider whether
it should overrule Cybor or apply deferential review to aspects of a district
Philips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
8 Id.
Id. ("[W]e will decide cases according to whatever mode or method results in the
outcome we desire, or at least allows us a seemingly plausible way out of the case.").
... Id. at 1331.
.o Id. (" [F]indings offact ... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of witnesses."
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a))).
102 Id.
'o' Id. at 1333 ("Before beginning claim construction, 'the scope and content of the prior
art [should] be determined,' . . . to establish context. The 'differences between the prior art
and the claims at issue [should] be ascertained[.] "' (first two alterations in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966))).
104 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc), vacated by 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015), on
remand, 790 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
' Id. at 1276.
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court's claim construction."o' Instead, for policy reasons, the court applied the
principles of stare decisis,o' thus affirming claim construction as a question
of law."o' The en banc court characterized its decision of whether to adhere
to Cybor as being informed by fifteen years of applying the de novo standard
to hundreds of cases."o' Throughout this time, claim construction hearings,
which are preliminary proceedings before trial and before discovery, were, and
continue to be commonplace in patent litigation.o They are often subject to
immediate appeal on summary judgment or injunction grounds."' Through-
out the fifteen years, there is a measure of stability, consistency, and reliability
that the judicial process will operate the way it has in the past.112 Stare decisis
"enhances predictability and efficiency in dispute resolution and legal pro-
ceedings, by enabling and fostering reliance on prior rulings."113 The policy
concerns of stability, judicial economy, reliability, consistency, and prudence
permeated the majority opinion.114 The alternative-to overturn Cybor-did
not provide a workable replacement, as "there is no agreement on a preferable
new mechanism of appellate review of claim construction[.]""' The court
ultimately concluded that arguments for modifying the plenary standard
of review did not outweigh "well-established principles and procedures."1 .
Nor could the court point to a public or private benefit that would justify
abandoning stare decisis.11
But, opponents argue that the principle of stare decisis does not justify
adhering to a decision that was wrongly decided and in contravention to
Supreme Court precedent and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Those
who favor giving deference to trial court findings of fact continue to point
out that Markman H never said claim interpretation was a question of law,
but merely that it was a question exclusively for the court."'
"' Id. at 1277.
107 "Stare decisis" is the "doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier
judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation." Stare Decisis, BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
... Lighting Ballast, 744 F.3d at 1276-77.









Id. at 1297 (O'Malley, J., dissenting).
Markman II, 517 U.S. 390 (1996).
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II. What Are the Policy Considerations That the Supreme
Court Has Sought to Address?
A. Supreme Court Finds No Role for the Jury in Claim
Interpretation
In Markman II, the Supreme Court addressed whether claim interpreta-
tion was exclusively a matter for the court and whether there was a Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial for interpreting claims.120 In order to determine
whether the Seventh Amendment is applicable, the Court looks at whether
the cause of action was tried at common law at the country's founding (1791),
or whether the action was analogous to one that was.121 If so, the Court then
asks whether there was a right to jury trial for that cause of action in 1791.122
Although it is clear patent infringement actions have historically been tried to
a jury, the question was whether interpreting patent claims was the province
of the jury in 179 1.123 After searching through history in England and the
United States, the Court found claim practice was not recognized by statute
until 1836, and was not a statutory requirement until 1870.124 The Court saw
the only analogue to modern claim construction was construing specifications,
but there was no recognized practice ofsending these interpretation issues to a
jury.125 Thus, the Supreme Court made a decision to "consider both the relative
interpretive skills of judges and juries and the statutory policies that ought
to be furthered by the allocation."126 The Court held, as a matter of policy,
that because judges are trained to analyze written instruments, "judges, not
juries, are the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms."127
Even where credibility determinations between expert testimony are the jury's
forte, the Court said that "any credibility determinations will be subsumed
within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document[.]" 1 28
In addition, the Court emphasized the importance of uniformity in claim
construction as another reason to make it an issue for the judge. According
to the Court, submitting the interpretation of written instruments to juries
would not serve uniformity.129 Nevertheless, the Court did nothold that claim
12 I. at 370, 376.
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interpretation was a question of law.130 Instead, the Court held the issue was
for the judge, not the jury.131 This distinction left the door open for an ap-
pellate court to give some deference to the trial judge's claim construction on
appeal.132 The Federal Circuit in Cybor, however, converted the Markman II
holding into a complete affirmance of Markman I, which held claim inter-
pretation was a question of law."'
B. The Supreme Court Defines the Standard of Review for Claim
Interpretation
In TevaPharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., the Supreme Court finally
answered the question it left open nineteen years ago in Markman II: whether
claim interpretation was a question of law or fact, thus solidifying the standard
of review on the issue.134 The Court held that the Federal Circuit must apply
a "clear error" standard of review when reviewing subsidiary matters made
during claim construction, overturning the de novo review standard.135 But,
the Court split the baby, giving two separate standards of review depending
on whether the claim interpretation was based solely on intrinsic evidence
versus extrinsic evidence.13
The facts in Teva concern the interpretation ofthe term "molecular weight"
in the context of a patent covering the method for manufacturing the drug
Copaxone, used to treat multiple sclerosis.13 The claim describes a range of
molecular weight for the active ingredient for the drug, copolymer-1, as having
"a molecular weight of 5 to 9 kilodaltons.138 At trial, the alleged infringer prof-
fered there were three possible interpretations ofthe term "molecular weight"
consequently rendering the claim term indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).139
The trial court reviewed extrinsic evidence from experts, concluding the claim
term was sufficiently definite."' But, on appeal, the Federal Circuit applied
de novo review and substituted its judgment for the trial court's, refusing
Id. at 376.
Id. at 391.
See, e.g., Teva Phams. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015).
See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 835.
15Id.
See id. at 84 1.
Id. at 835.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 835-36. § 112(b) reads, in pertinent part: "The specification shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the inventor or ajoint inventor regards as the invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
"' Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 836.
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to defer to its findings."' Consequently, the patent was held invalid.142 The
Supreme Court then granted certiorari to clarify the standard of review.143
The Court said Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6)"4 applies to the
Federal Circuit when reviewing district court claim construction. 14 In other
words, the Federal Circuit must defer to a district court's findings of fact,
unless the Federal Circuit finds them clearly erroneous, including judgments
as to credibility of witnesses. 4 Making an emphatic statement, the Court
said there are no exceptions to Rule 52(a)(6).14 It applies to all fact-findings,
including both subsidiary and ultimate facts. 14 It is not the role of appellate
courts to decide factual issues de novo.14, Interestingly, the Court said that,
even if there were exceptions, it finds no compelling reason for one here.o
This language is reminiscent of language the Supreme Court has used to ad-
monish the Federal Circuit for creating legal rules for patent law that differ
from those traditionally applied in law and equity across all legal disciplines.151
C. Supreme Court Holds Traditional Legal Principles Apply
Equally to Patent Law
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has reminded the Federal Cir-
cuit that patent law is no different. Traditional rules used for all other areas
of law apply equally to patent law.152 For example, in eBay Inc. v. MercEx-
change, LLC,153 the Supreme Court held that the "decision whether to grant
or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district
courts, ... [which] must be exercised consistent with traditional principles
of equity[.]" 1 4 The Patent Act provides that "patents shall have the attributes
of personal property"" and that courts "may grant injunctions in accordance
12Id.
13Id.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (2009).
Teva, 135 S. Ct at 836 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).
Id. at 836, 840; accord FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
Teva, 135 S. Ct at 836-37 (citing Pullman-Standardv. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,287 (1982)).
Id. at 837.
Id. (citing Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573).
" Id.
' See, e.g., ebay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 , 391-92 (2006).
152 Id. at 394-95 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (agreeing with the Court's holding that "the
decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of
the district courts . . . in patent disputes no less than in other cases").
'' 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
"5 Id. at 394.
' 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
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with the principles of equity[.]""' Thus, the Federal Circuit's "general rule
[for] ... issu[ing] permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent
exceptional circumstances" violates the four-factor test traditionally used in
equity to decide whether to issue permanent injunctive relief."' Further, such
disregard for tradition upsets the standard of review for permanent injunctive
relief. It is within the trial court's discretion to grant or deny permanent injunc-
tive relief, and that decision is reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion."'
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,"' the petitioner challenged the
long-held Federal Circuit practice of holding that licensees in good standing
have no justiciable controversy against patent licensors to challenge patent
validity or noninfringement in a declaratory judgment action.160 Histori-
cally, a patent licensee was required to breach a patent license agreement to
create an actual controversy before declaratory judgment jurisdiction could
attach.161 Generally, Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal court
jurisdiction to "Cases" and "Controversies."162 The Declaratory Judgment Act
achieves this requirement by triggering subject matter jurisdiction only for
actual controversies.163 In MedImmune, however, the Supreme Court overruled
the Federal Circuit, holding that Article III did not require the petitioner to
terminate the patent license agreement before seeking a declaratory judgment
in federal court. 164The Court followed its traditional and uniform framework
to assess whether an Article III case or controversy exists, not a different patent
law version of it. 1 A court must look at all of the circumstances and ensure
that the controversy is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
Id. § 283.
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. The traditional four-factor test requires a plaintiff to show:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law ... are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted; and
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
Id.
8 Id.
'5 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
Id. at 120-21.
Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 137.
` See id. at 126-29.
THE DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION? 207
parties having adverse legal interests[.]""' Further, the action must be a "real
and substantial" controversy as opposed to an advisory opinion predicated
on hypothetical facts.6
In Teva, the Supreme Court continued its efforts to streamline patent law
jurisprudence with judicial application ofthe law universally in other areas. 1
The Court clarified that a "conclusion that an issue is for the judge does not
indicate that Rule 52(a) is inapplicable.""' The Supreme Court rejected as
unsubstantiated the Federal Circuit's concern that deferring to trial court
findings of fact would create less uniformity in claim construction.170 But,
the Court did make a distinction between the standard of review that courts
should apply when claim construction depends on unambiguous intrinsic
evidence (presumably where underlying factual disputes are nonexistent),
and when extrinsic evidence is obtained to shed light on claim meaning. 1
When a district court reviews evidence solely intrinsic to the patent, the
judge's determination is solely a legal question to be reviewed de novo.172
When, however, the court must look at extrinsic evidence to gather claim
meaning, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings based on that
evidence.173 "[T]his subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error
on appeal.""4 The Court specifically gave as an example of the kind of fact-
finding worthy of deference on appeal: when a trial court resolves a dispute
regarding testimony between experts as to claim meaning or a technical
term.1 ' The Court made clear, however, that the ultimate interpretation of
the claim is a legal conclusion, which is reviewed de novo."1 ' But, an appellate
court must find that a trial judge clearly erred in making factual findings in
order to overturn how the judge resolved the factual dispute."1 Further, "[a] n
I"'. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937)).
1I7 I (internal quotation marks omitted).
"' SeeTeva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015). (" [W]hen we
held in Markman ... claim construction is for the judge .. ., we did not create an exception
from the ordinary rule governing appellate review of factual matters.").
17 Id at 839-40 ("Neither the Circuit nor Sandoz ... has shown that ... divergent claim
construction ... should occur more than occasionally.").
171 Id at 84 1.
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appellate court . . . should review for clear error those factual findings that
underlie a district court's claim construction.""'
At trial, the district court credited the petitioner's expert with the proper
interpretation of "molecular weight," rejecting respondent's expert's testimo-
ny."' The Federal Circuit incorrectly reviewed the trial court's findings of fact
because no clear error was found in overturning the trial court's claim con-
struction."'o Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit's
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the
new standard of review.
D. Policy Considerations Evaluated in the Dissent
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, disagreed that claim construction involves
findings of fact.182 If it did, Justice Thomas agreed that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a)(6) (Rule 52) would apply. 183justice Thomas looked to Miller
v. Fenton1 94 to evaluate how the Court reviewed district court determinations
at the time Rule 52 was adopted."' The more similar a question is to simple
historical fact, the more it is like a question of fact.186 The more a question
is applicable beyond the parties' dispute, the more it resembles a question of
law."' The question then becomes whether the subsidiary findings underlying
claim construction are more like those underlying statutory construction or
those underlying construction of contracts and deeds.' Because patents are
government-granted property that oblige the public at large, and not like a
bilateral contract expressing the parties' actual intent, the dissent concludes
that patents are more like statutes and deeds than contracts."" De novo review
of statutory construction "ensures [s] that the construction is not skewed by
the specific evidence presented in a given case[,]" thus creating uniformity.9 0
Furthermore, the dissent says, even when extrinsic evidence is reviewed,
it is looked at in a way that one of ordinary skill would have understood the
Id. at 842.
See id. at 842-43.
... Id. at 843.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 844 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8 See id.
84 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
' Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Miller, 474 U.S. at 116).
8 Id.
88 Id. at 847.
8 Id.
''Id. at 848.
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claim term at the time of filing. Because there is no actual person of ordinary
skill, this analysis is more akin to a conclusion of law than a finding of fact.192
Criticizing the majority's failure to justify its holding in terms ofwhich judicial
actor is better situated to promote uniformity, the dissent opined that appel-
late courts are better than trial courts for this purpose.193 For policy reasons,
the dissent contended that attaining uniformity means appellate courts are
in a better position to control the claim construction outcome even in rare
cases where subsidiary fact-finding is necessary. 4 "[T]he line between fact
and law is an uncertain one[,]" and the majority's opinion is likely to create
"collateral litigation over the line between law and fact.""
III. The Federal Circuit's Review of Claim Construction
Post- Teva
Perhaps because the Federal Circuit declared claim construction a ques-
tion of law in Markman J,16 since 1995 litigants have not steered trial judges
toward make findings of fact regarding evidence used to support their claim
construction.7 Often, on appeal, records were devoid of the kind of findings
of fact Rule 52(a) envisioned being reviewed for clear error." Because a trial
See id. at 849.
192 Id.
See id. at 851.
Id.
Id. at 8 5 2.
SeeMarkman I, 52E3d967,979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (enbanc),affld, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
Cf ERIC M. DOBRUSIN AND KATHERINE E. WHITE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGA-
TION: PRETRIAL PRACTICE §13.03[B] (Aspen, 3d ed. 2008 & Supp. 2015) (urging litigants
to submit findings of fact, likely because litigants are not already doing so). The authors
recommend:
Under appropriate circumstances, litigants should consider various procedures to fa-
cilitate the grant of the relief requested, including the submission of proposed orders
or proposedfindings offact and conclusions of law. A litigant who carefully drafts such
a document and succeeds in persuading the judge to adopt it may obviate potential
grounds for appeal based upon the failure of a district court to set forth its findings
and conclusions, such as in a preliminary injunction context. Orders or findings and
conclusions well supported by the record also help to reduce the burden of locating
support in the event of an appeal, months or years later. Moreover, well-drafted state-
ments of uncontested fact (required in some jurisdictions) may facilitate the task of
the court in preparing a reasoned opinion.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Info-Hold, Inc. v. Ap-
plied Media Techs. Corp., 783 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (providing an example of
litigants who did not steer courts towards making findings of fact).
'9' Eg., Sociedad Espanola de Electromedicina y Calidad, S.A. v. Blue Ridge X-Ray Co.,
No. 2015-1102, 2015 WL 4603764, at *2 (Fed. Cir. July 31, 2015); Biosig Instruments,
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court's claim construction received no deference, judges had little motivation
to provide rationale for how the claims were construed."' Because the trial
court record is often devoid of trial court findings of fact, the Federal Circuit
continues to treat claim interpretation as a question of law post- Teva, with
few exceptions.200 Accordingly, it often says the trial court's claim construction
was based solely on intrinsic evidence, and thus requires no deference. 201 In
cases where the Federal Circuit finds the extrinsic evidence in conflict with
the intrinsic evidence, the court finds the extrinsic evidence is not credible.202
Even in cases where conflicting expert testimony is heard, the Federal Circuit
says it is unclear that such extrinsic evidence was relied upon in the trial court's
claim construction determination.203 Many of these cases are discussed below.
Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc. (Nautilus II), 783 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Info-Hold, 783 F.3d at 1266.
200 Eg., Sociedad Espanola, 2015 WL 4603764, at *2; Info-Hold, 783 F.3d at 1266;
Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P'ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Nautilus
I, 783 F.3d at 1378.
21 Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., No. 2014-1370, 2015 WL 4680726,
at * 9 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 2015) ("We review the district court's claim construction here
de novo because it relied only on evidence intrinsic to the [] patent."); Sociedad Espanola,
2015 WL 4603764, at *2 ("Because the district court relied only on intrinsic evidence in its
claim construction, we review its claim construction entirely de novo." (emphasis omitted));
Info-Hold, 783 F.3d at 1373 (holding district court's claim construction was based solely
on intrinsic evidence, thus de novo review); Cadence Pharms. Inc. v. Exela Pharmsci Inc.,
780 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reviewing district court's claim construction, based
entirely on intrinsic evidence, de novo); Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int'l, Inc., 778 F.3d
1021, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reviewing claim construction de novo on appeal because only
intrinsic evidence at issue); Fenner Invs., 778 F.3d at 1321-22 (affirming district court's
claim construction based on intrinsic evidence); In re Papst Licensing Dig. Camera Patent
Litig., 778 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (applying de novo review because trial court
only relied on intrinsic evidence); see also Info-Hold, 783 F.3d at 1266 (applying the de novo
standard of review to purely intrinsic evidence, or because no findings of fact were made, it
was categorized neither as intrinsic nor extrinsic); see also Eidos Display, LLC. v. AU Optronics
Corp., 779 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("To the extent the district court considered
extrinsic evidence in its claim construction order . . . that evidence is ultimately immate-
rial to the outcome because the intrinsic record is clear."); see also Nautilus II, 783 F.3d at
1382 ("Our prior analysis primarily relied on intrinsic evidence and we found the extrinsic
evidence underscores the intrinsic evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc. (Nautilus]), 715 F.3d 891, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
202 Philips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317-19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also
Kaneka Corp. v. Xiamen Kingdomway Grp. Co., 790 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
203 See Shire Dev., LLC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 787 F.3d 1359, 1364-65, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
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In Enzo Biochem Inc. v. Applera Corp.,204 the patented invention involved
using nucleotide probes to "detect, monitor, localize, or isolate nucleic acids"
in very small quantities when sequencing deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA"). 205
The term in dispute is "at least one component."206 The district court con-
sulted both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, including expert testimony, and
concluded that "at least one component" meant one or more.20 On appeal,
the Federal Circuit substituted its own claim construction for that of the trial
court's, finding that "at least one" means more than two. 8 Although the trial
court heard expert estimony, the Federal Circuit characterized it as address-
ing a fundamentally different question than the specific issue in dispute.209
Although the Federal Circuit made reference to its need to defer to the
trial court's findings under Teva, the Federal Circuit chose to override that
need, relying more on how it interprets the specification, without actually
reviewing the trial court's findings for clear error.210 In essence, the court
found the extrinsic evidence to be inappropriate.211 In her dissent, Judge
Newman criticized the majority for failing to defer to the trial court find-
ings of fact without pointing to any contrary evidence to justify the Federal
Circuit's holding.212 She saw that, instead, the court was holding grammar
and linguistics paramount in interpreting the claims, while ignoring the ex-
pert testimony, the trial court's findings, and the jury verdict.213 This case is
an robust example of how the Federal Circuit continues to wield its control
over claim construction, even post- Teva.
In Shire Development, LLC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,214 after the case
was remanded following Teva, the Federal Circuit gave no deference to the
trial court's claim construction because the case did not involve factual find-
ings.2 15 Expert testimony was heard in a Markman hearing and at trial.21 6 But,
because the district court made no apparent factual findings underlying its
204 780 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
205 Id. at 1150.
206 See id. at 1154.
207 Id. at 1155.
208 See id. at 1154.
209 Id. at 1156 ("However, the expert testimony cited by Enzo does not discuss whether
ligands ... could be directly detected, but instead whether one could directly detect [a pure
solution of one ligand] . . . , a fundamentally different question.").
210 See id.
211 See id.
212 Id. at 1159 (Newman, J., dissenting).
213 Id.
214 787 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
21Id. at 1361.
21Id. at 1368.
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claim constructions of the terms "inner lipophilic matrix" and "outer hydro-
philic matrix," the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, without invoking
a deferential standard of review in its new claim construction.21 The question
was whether the two matrices had to be "separate and distinct."218 The district
court did not think so, but the Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that the
intrinsic evidence pointed towards requiring the matrices to be "separate and
distinct."2 19 Because the trial court did not make factual findings as required
by Rule 52(a), the Federal Circuit should have remanded the case for factual
findings supporting the claim construction determination. Instead, the Federal
Circuit maintained control over the claim interpretation.
In Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. Microstrategy, Inc.,220 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's claim construction, which was based wholly on
the intrinsic evidence.221 The patentee put on an expert witness to testify as
to the meaning of the disputed claim term.222 But the Federal Circuit held
that the district court did not rely on this testimony because the prosecution
history was central to the district court's claim construction, and the expert
221
conceded the disputed term did not have a consistent use.
In Kaneka Corp. v. Xiamen Kingdomway Group Co.,224 the district court's
claim construction, which relied on dictionary meanings and related testimony
(extrinsic evidence), conflicted with the intrinsic record.2 25 The Federal Circuit
found the district court's interpretation of the term "sealed tank" excluded all
disclosed embodiments.2 26 Plus, the term "sealed" could be established from
the specification.22 Since the summary judgment of noninfringement was
based on an erroneous claim construction, it was vacated and remanded.2 2 8
But, it was not remanded specifically to develop the record to include find-
ings of fact that support the court's claim construction.229
217Id.
21Id. at 1366.
21Id. at 1366, 1368.
220 782 E3d 671 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
221Id. at 676, 681.
222See id. at 677.
22Id. at 678.
224 790 E3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
221 Id. at 1304.
226 id.
227 Id. at 1305.
228 Id. at 1303, 1307.
229 Cf id at 1303,1307 (indicating summary judgment should be vacated when based on
an erroneous claim construction; Federal Circuit remanding to district court for proceedings
consistent with finding of erroneous claim construction).
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In EON Corp. IPHoldings LLCv. A Te'TMobility LLC,230 the trial court, on
summary judgment, found all the asserted claims to be indefinite.231 The claim
construction analysis was intertwined with the indefiniteness determination.232
Because the Federal Circuit found no clear error in the district court's factual
findings resulting from its expert testimony analysis, it affirmed.233 Although
the Federal Circuit deferred to the trial court here, the indefiniteness issues
234
drove the outcome.
At least one case was remanded to further develop the record to support
the trial court's claim construction. In an unpublished opinion, Virginia In-
novation Sciences, Inc. v. SamsungElectonics Co.,235 extrinsic evidence had to be
consulted because the intrinsic evidence was insufficient for claim construction
purposes.236 Because neither the intrinsic nor the extrinsic evidence of record
clarifies what the claim term "display format" means, the case was remanded
to further develop the record to determine its meaning.237
Exceptionally, the Federal Circuit properly deferred to the trial court findings
of fact regarding the extrinsic evidence in an unpublished opinion, Flexiteek
Americas, Inc. v. Plasteak, Inc.238 To support its claim construction, the district
231
court reviewed intrinsic evidence, as well as expert witness declarations.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit stated, "[w] e conclude that the district court
properly construed the term 'longitudinal slots' in light of both the intrinsic
and extrinsic evidence.
Conclusion
In Teva, the Supreme Court made clear what policy considerations it
deems important in analyzing claim construction. The Court is especially
concerned about whether a trial judge or an appellate court is best suited to
decide the issue. The more an issue is applicable beyond the parties' dispute,
23 785 F.3d 616 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
21Id. at 619.
232 Id. at 620.
233 Id. at 624 ("[B] ased on expert testimony, the district court found that 'special code
would have to be written in order to accomplish the claimed functionality.' " (quoting EON
Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. FLO TV Inc., No. CV 10-812-RGA, 2014 WL 906182, at *5
(D. Del. Mar. 4, 2014)).
234Id.
23 No. 2014-1477, 2015 WL 3555700 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 9, 2015) (unpublished).
21Id. at *7.
237Id.
238 SeeNo. 2014-1214, 2015 WL 1244475, at*3 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 19, 2015) (unpublished).
239 See id. at *2.
240Id. at 3.
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the more it resembles a question of law.241 Appellate courts, especially courts
with national jurisdiction, can bring great uniformity to the law, which
creates clarity. If such clarity is needed, the standard of review should be de
novo.242 The Court emphasized that it is not the role of the appellate courts
to decide factual issues de novo.243 Because the trial judge is privy to evidence
presented firsthand over an extended period of time, trial courts are better at
making credibility determinations.244 The more akin a question is to simple
historical fact, the more it is like a question of fact.245 After reciting these
policy considerations, the Supreme Court in Teva overturned twenty ears of
precedent and changed the standard of review for claim construction. Where
the trial court's claim construction is based solely on intrinsic evidence, the
appellate court now gives it now deference, reviewing the claim construction
de novo. But where the trial court uses extrinsic evidence to construe claims,
the appellate courts are required to give deference to trial court findings of
fact as required under Rule 52(a).
Although the Federal Circuit no longer focuses on the right to jury trial
issue post-Markman II, the court still seeks control over claim construction.
This is evident from the court's failure to apply the new standard of review
required by Teva. Because the Federal Circuit has treated claim construction
as a question of law since 1995, cases pending before Teva often do not have
robust records containing trial court findings of fact. Post- Teva, appellate
courts are required to defer to trial court findings of fact. If the trial court does
not make findings of fact, the appellate court must remand so that factual
findings can be made. Instead, the Federal Circuit is improperly substituting
its own claim construction for that of the trial court's without remanding for
those findings. It is in direct conflict with Teva for the court to substitute its
claim construction for the district court's and not remand for findings of fact.
Patent litigation is often complex. To manage these cases, many district
courts have made their own local patent rules246 to advance best practices
241 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 845 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985)).
242 See id. at 851 ("The need for uniformity in claim construction also weighs heavily in
favor of de novo review of subsidiary evidentiary determinations.").
243Id. at 837 (majority opinion).
244 Salve ReginaColl.v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225,232-33 (1991); see also Richard H.W. Maloy,
"Standards ofReview'"-Just a Tip ofthe Icicle, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 603, 629 (2000).
24' Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Miller, 474 U.S. at 116).
246 See FED. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1) ("After giving public notice and an opportunity for com-
ment, a district court, acting by a majority of its district judges, may adopt and amend rules
governing its practice.").
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for patent infringement cases, including Markman hearings.24 But, because
these efforts took place in an environment where claim construction was a
question of law, these rules do not address how to focus the trial court's claim
construction in terms of making findings of fact optimal for use on appeal.
The rules focus more on case management procedures to reduce the pendency
time for patent litigation and increase efficiency.248 Perhaps, post- Teva, there
should be another movement to develop local patent rules that will address
how to better create a full record establishing trial court factual findings that
relate to its claim construction determinations.
247 See, e.g., Patent Rules Made Easy: Basics, LOCAL PATENT RULES, HTTP://WWW.LOCAL-
PATENTRULES.COM/BASICS/ (LAST UPDATED Nov. 2014).
248 See generally Judge Matthew F. Kennelly & Edward D. Manzo, Northern District of
Illinois Adopts Local Patent Rules, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 202 (2009).

